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ESSAY

DEAD PRECEDENTS
Riley T. Svikhart*
INTRODUCTION
Shaun McCutcheon’s was the “next big campaign finance case to go before
1
the Supreme Court.”
When the Alabama GOP warned the conservative
businessman that his 2010 federal campaign contributions might soon exceed a
2
congressionally imposed limit, he decided to “take a stand.”
Together,
McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee (RNC)—which “wish[ed] to
receive the contributions that McCutcheon and similarly situated individuals would
3
like to make” in the absence of such aggregate contribution limits —challenged the
4
responsible statutory regime on First Amendment grounds and attracted national
5
attention en route to a victory before the Supreme Court.
But while McCutcheon and the RNC prevailed in their case, they failed in
another noteworthy regard—Chief Justice Roberts’s controlling opinion declined
their request to squarely overrule a relevant portion of the landmark campaign

© 2017 Riley T. Svikhart. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as
each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review Online, and
includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2018; Bachelor of Arts in
Economics & Business, Westmont College, 2015. Thank you to Professor John Nagle for his
help and guidance throughout law school, and for allowing me to prepare this Essay in a directed
reading. Thanks also to Connor Whitting for encouraging my pursuit of this topic.
1 Paul Blumenthal, Next Citizens United? McCutcheon Supreme Court Case Targets
Campaign
Contribution
Limits,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(July
31,
2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/31/mccutcheon-supreme-court_n_3678555.html.
2 Shaun McCutcheon, Donation Caps Hurt Democracy, POLITICO (Oct. 6, 2013),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/mccutcheon-how-campaign-spending-caps-hurtamerican-democracy-097834.
3 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1443 (2014) (plurality opinion).
4 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972),
amended by Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
5 A plurality of the Supreme Court sided with McCutcheon, holding the aggregate limits
McCutcheon complained of “invalid under the First Amendment.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at
1442.
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finance case Buckley v. Valeo. The McCutcheon Court’s hesitance to overrule a
precedent like Buckley was no new phenomenon. On the contrary, it was
characteristic of a broader trend: today’s Supreme Court is as reluctant as ever to
overrule Supreme Court cases, even when the precedential value of such cases will
7
be undermined by the Court’s holding in the case at bar.
Just how pronounced is this tendency, how is it best explained, and what are
its ramifications? These questions are the subject of this Essay, which proceeds in
two parts. Part I explores the Roberts Court’s reluctance to overrule Supreme
Court precedents more thoroughly. Part II provides a modest account for this
phenomenon. Section II.A considers the relationship between the Roberts Court’s
reluctance to overrule Supreme Court precedents and its law declaration bent.
Section II.B evaluates this reluctance in light of the doctrinal commitment of stare
decisis. Finally, Section II.C examines the link between the Roberts Court’s
treatment of dying precedents and its trademark adherence to the constitutional
avoidance doctrine.
I.

LIMITED TO ITS FACTS: THE NOT-SO-CURIOUS CASE OF J.I. CASE CO. V. BORAK
8

What is the modern significance of J.I. Case Co. v. Borak? With respect to
this case and countless others still technically on the books in the United States
Reports, the answer is “very little.” Once a critical pillar of the Supreme Court’s
9
implied rights of action jurisprudence, Borak has, for all intents and purposes,
10
been relegated to the dustbin of history.
Indeed, one case after another has
followed in Borak’s direct line, and each has deepened the Court’s departure from
11
its purposive rationale.
6 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
7 See infra Part I.
8 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
9 For a small sampling of articles in this area, see Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R.
Clark, The Original Source of the Cause of Action in Federal Courts: The Example of the Alien
Tort Statute, 101 VA. L. REV. 609 (2015); H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation,
Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV.
501 (1986); Jonathan A. Marcantel, Abolishing Implied Private Rights of Action Pursuant to
Federal Statutes, 39 J. LEGIS. 251 (2013); Marc I. Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action
Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 33 (1979).
10 See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, The Possible Future of Private Rights of Action for Proxy
Fraud: The Parallel Between Borak and Wilko, 70 NEB. L. REV. 306, 307 (1991) (observing that
the Court has “allowed the narrow holding[] of . . . Borak to survive” in spite of the fact that its
“foundation” has been “demolished”); see also id. at 308 (“Borak would not survive under the
new standard, but so far the Court has treated [it] as a historical anomaly, regretfully wrong but
nevertheless valid.” (emphasis added)).
11 Borak represents “[t]he high water mark of judicially inferred remedies.” RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
739 (7th ed. 2015). Its broad holding that “it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose,” Borak, 377 U.S. at 433,
has since been undermined repeatedly. With the adoption of a brand new four-factor analysis just
eleven years later, the Court began to backpedal from its holding in Borak, and by 1979 a handful
of Supreme Court cases had essentially limited the case to its facts. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,
78 (1975) (announcing a four-prong functional test in an area previously dictated by Borak’s
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In the meantime, the Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation has
12
undergone momentous change, implied rights of action doctrine has shifted
13
14
markedly, and Borak’s contemporary irrelevance has become well-settled. But
still, the case persists. Limited to its narrowest facts, Borak bears the same red flag
15
16
on Westlaw as more famous relics like Swift v. Tyson and Plessy v. Ferguson.
But while Borak admittedly differs from these legal artifacts by retaining
17
staying power within a limited legal domain, its principal distinction from these
cases lies in the reason for its red flag. Unlike these cases of legal eras past, Borak
18
19
has never been squarely overruled, by “stealth” or otherwise. On the contrary,

purposive approach); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)
(refusing to imply a private right of action under Cort test); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S.
677, 689–709 (1979) (inferring a private right of action but evaluating case under Cort factors);
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60–72 (1978) (refusing to imply a right of action
under Cort test); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 37–42 (1977) (same). If any doubt
remained as to Borak’s state, the Court’s 2001 ruling in Alexander v. Sandoval placed a nail in
the lifeless case’s coffin. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). There, the Court completed an about-face thirtyseven years in the making, abandoning Borak in both style and substance. Where Borak’s
approach to the statutory question at issue was purposive, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in
Sandoval was unmistakably textualist. See id. at 287 (“Having sworn off the habit of venturing
beyond Congress’s intent, we will not accept respondents’ invitation to have one last drink.”).
12 The rise of “new textualism” stemmed from Justice Scalia’s profound influence on the
field of statutory interpretation. Indeed, as Justice Kagan famously observed, “we’re all
textualists now in a way that just was not remotely true when Justice Scalia joined the bench.”
Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of
Statutes at 8:29 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discussesstatutory-interpretation/; see also Abbe R. Gluck, Justice Scalia’s Unfinished Business in
Statutory Interpretation: Where Textualism’s Formalism Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2053, 2054 (2017) (“First things first. No one had a more important impact on the modern theory
and practice of statutory interpretation than did Justice Scalia.”).
13 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
14 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287.
15 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
17 Indeed, Borak is still good and important law within the sphere of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.). In keeping with its general reluctance to “overturn[] earlier decisions that
had recognized a private right of action under a more liberal approach,” the Court subsequently
“reaffirmed [a] private right of action [in another section of the statute from which the Borak
Court implied a federal right of action].” FALLON ET AL., supra note 11, at 740; see also Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983); Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
18 Borak’s red flag stems from the Court’s recognition of its abrogation in Correctional
Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 67 n.3 (2001) (“Since our decision in Borak, we have
retreated from our previous willingness to imply a cause of action where Congress has not
provided one. . . . Just last Term it was noted that we ‘abandoned’ the view of Borak decades ago,
and have repeatedly declined to ‘revert’ to ‘the understanding of private causes of action that held
sway 40 years ago.’” (quoting Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287)).
19 See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 6–16 (2010); Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings,
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it has been left to wither on the precedential vine by a long line of cases that have
signaled its fate loudly and clearly. Cort v. Ash’s sharp break from its reasoning in
1975 was exacerbated by each subsequent case applying Cort’s more stringent test
in place of Borak’s liberal approach. Alexander v. Sandoval’s official abrogation
of Borak—which had by then been besieged by twenty-six years of critical cases—
finally put the case out of its misery from a practical standpoint, but to “abrogate”
is not to “overrule.”
In a 1989 concurrence, Justice Scalia observed the “four courses” the Court
might choose in any case: “reaffirm [the prior case],” “overrule it explicitly,”
20
“overrule it sub silentio,” or “avoid the question.” Professor Barry Friedman has
noted a fifth common option that Justice Scalia left out: “distinguish[ing] the
21
22
precedent.” Some cases, in addition, are overridden directly by Congress, or
23
even, in rare circumstances, by constitutional amendment.
The Court’s roundabout abrogation of Borak does not fit neatly within either
of these categories. Clearly, however, it is not an explicit overruling. That plainest
form of judicial departure from precedent is a power that the Supreme Court
wields exclusively, for where lower courts may observe the abrogation of a
Supreme Court precedent by subsequent Supreme Court decisions, statutes, and the
like, the high court alone can clearly articulate to the rest of the country that one of
24
its prior cases has been extinguished.
With respect to a case of Borak’s limited stature and narrow importance,
searching for an appropriate categorization along these lines may be a pointless
endeavor. In some subsequent decisions it was distinguished and in others it was
criticized outright, but regardless, practitioners, lower courts, and professors know
well by now that the case’s holding governs merely in the context of the single
federal statute it considered, and that its purposive rationale has fallen out of
25
favor.
However, countless other cases share Borak’s fate from a practical
standpoint but remain standing as precedents of vague legal worth. Whether this is
a problem or not, it is certainly an observable phenomenon. Indeed, former
Solicitor General Paul Clement once described his practice of inviting the Justices

Invitations, Time Bombs, and Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61
EMORY L.J. 779 (2012).
20 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
21 Friedman, supra note 19, at 8.
22 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (offering a historical overview of congressional overrides of
judicial statutory interpretations).
23 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by U.S.
CONST. amends. XIII, XIV; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by U.S.
CONST. amend. XI.
24 See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)
(“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
rejected in some other line of decisions, the [lower court] should follow the case which directly
controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”).
25 Indeed, thousands of law students are instructed as such each year. See, e.g., FALLON ET
AL., supra note 11, at 739–41.
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to consider the option of overruling a precedent that is unhelpful to his position as
26
“the axe behind the proverbial pane of glass: ‘break in case of emergency only.’”
Advocates like Clement certainly take their cues from the Supreme Court, but
objective evidence confirms Clement’s observation as well. While the Supreme
Court has always been loath to arouse the stare decisis ramifications that come
with overturning a prior case, the Roberts Court has been particularly cautious.
Indeed, the Court issued only nine overruling decisions in the Chief Justice’s first
27
twelve terms.
Its institutional predecessor, the Rehnquist Court, overruled at
28
least one precedent in every forty-one cases over its nineteen-year span. And the
Burger and Warren Courts were even more prolific overrulers than the Rehnquist
29
Court, overturning at least one precedent in about three decisions per year. The
upshot is clear: the Rehnquist Court overruled Supreme Court precedent less
frequently than the Burger and Warren Courts, but still overruled prior decisions at
more than double the rate of the Roberts Court.
At least in theory, this discrepancy seems counterintuitive, as the Roberts
Court inevitably oversees a larger body of Supreme Court precedent than any other
30
Court has. While broader factors such as congressional inaction and the Court’s
31
shrinking docket may account for some of this disparity, it is unlikely that
external factors are entirely responsible for the Roberts Court’s particular hesitance
to overrule Supreme Court precedents.
Although several commentators have considered the value (or lack thereof)
of pruning dead or flawed precedents from the long and winding branch of
32
Supreme Court cases, this Essay takes no position in this normative debate.
26 Paul Clement, Vaughan Lecture: Paul Clement, YOUTUBE (Oct. 26, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EvNfU1ErcqM. Clement, the 43rd Solicitor General of the
United States, is the most prolific Supreme Court advocate of the modern era. Paul D. Clement,
BANCROFT PLLC, http://www.bancroftpllc.com/who-we-are/paul-clement/ (last visited Aug. 15,
2017) (“Mr. Clement has argued more Supreme Court cases since 2000 than any lawyer in or out
of government.”).
27 See U.S. GOV’T PUBL’G OFFICE, SUPREME COURT DECISIONS OVERRULED BY
SUBSEQUENT DECISION 2614–15 (2017). During Chief Justice Roberts’s tenure of twelve years
and counting, this averages to less than one of the roughly eighty cases that the Supreme Court
hears annually.
28 See id. at 2613–14.
29 The Burger and Warren Courts issued fifty-five and forty-three overruling decisions
respectively. See id. at 2608–13.
30 See, e.g., Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of
Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2217 (2013) (“Gridlock has Congress in a
headlock. Gripped by stalemate, America’s chief lawmaking body can barely muster the ability
to make law.”).
31 See, e.g., Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking
Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012); Kenneth W. Starr, Essay, The Supreme Court and
Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363 (2006).
32 Compare, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91
TEX. L. REV. 1711, 1712 (2013) (“[L]ess rides on the strength of stare decisis than is commonly
supposed. . . . [T]he prohibition upon advisory opinions, the obligation of lower courts to follow
Supreme Court precedent, the Court’s certiorari standards, its rule confining the question at issue
to the one presented by the litigant, and the fact that the Court is a multimember institution whose
members have life tenure are all factors that work together to contribute to continuity in the
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Instead, Part II examines how a trio of strong doctrinal commitments may
contribute to this tendency of the Roberts Court.
II.

EXPLAINING THE ROBERTS COURT’S RELUCTANCE TO OVERRULE PRECEDENTS

This Part explores the relationship between the Roberts Court’s keen
preference for distinguishing cases like Borak and its predispositions in three other
areas. Needless to say, this list of explanatory factors is far from exhaustive, as
each unique case brings a unique set of considerations. Along with typical
analyses of text, history, precedent, structure, and policy, commentators have noted
33
34
how factors as wide-ranging as politics and law clerks influence Supreme Court
decisionmaking. Professor Richard Hasen has observed the “many ways” by
35
which “Justices can move the law,” and each of these methods may also bear on
the outcome of any case. Indeed, “[w]hether to overrule a dubious precedent is”
36
always “one of the most significant and complex questions that judges confront.”
As a result, it would be foolish to propose a one-size-fits-all explanation for the
37
slow pace at which the Roberts Court has overruled Supreme Court precedents.
Still, it is worthwhile to consider how certain overarching concerns of the Roberts
Court contribute to such an outcome.
A. The Roberts Court as a “Law Declaration” Enterprise
If the primary role of the Supreme Court is to announce and declare the law,
then why overrule a precedent that can otherwise be distinguished or just left
alone? This central question flows naturally out of the “law declaration” model of
the judicial function and may explain much of the Roberts Court’s relative
hesitance to overrule Supreme Court precedents.
There is little doubt that the Roberts Court views itself as a law-declaring
enterprise—or, at the very least, that it acts that way. The immense volume of
38
cases presented by our overflowing administrative state and extensive assortment

law.”), with, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Essay, The Conservative Case for Precedent, 31 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 977, 981 (2008) (“A judiciary that stood firm with a strong theory of precedent
would rechannel our nation back toward democratic institutions and away from using the courts
to make social policy.”).
33 See, e.g., Bradley W. Joondeph, The Many Meanings of “Politics” in Judicial Decision
Making, 77 UMKC L. REV. 347 (2008).
34 See, e.g., Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court
Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51 (2008).
35 Hasen, supra note 19, at 799.
36 Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 180 (2014).
37 It would be equally foolish to simplify the thought process that goes into overruling a
case. See id. at 180–81 (“The topic has, quite properly, received considerable attention in case
law, scholarly commentary, and political discourse.” (footnotes omitted)).
38 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he federal bureaucracy continues to grow; in the last 15 years, Congress has
launched more than 50 new agencies.”).
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40

of federal rights forces the Court to pick and choose its cases carefully. This
selectivity has led the Court to adopt a “law declaration” conception of the judicial
role, which reads Article III’s extension of federal “judicial Power” to certain
41
categories of “Cases” and “Controversies” to create a federal judiciary that is
“not . . . a mere settler of disputes, but rather . . . an institution with a distinctive
42
capacity to declare and explicate norms that transcend individual controversies.”
As a result, the competing “dispute resolution” model of the judicial role has been
generally supplanted in all but a few (although vitally important) justiciability
43
doctrines. In reality, of course, the models intersect, as no degree of practical
44
significance can, by itself, form a legitimate basis for judicial review. But the
45
dominance of the “law declaration” model is clear and manifests itself in the
internal rules that the Court uses to channel its discretionary consideration of cert

39 While it cannot truly be said that for “every right . . . withheld [there is a] remedy,”
federal statutes have created a vast patchwork of mechanisms for the judicial enforcement of
federal rights. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803). Thank you to Professor
Amy Coney Barrett for this helpful characterization.
40 As most every lawyer knows, the Supreme Court grants between 100 and 150 of the
more than 7,000 cert petitions it is presented with each year. See Supreme Court Procedures,
U.S.
COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/abouteducational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 (last visited Aug. 14, 2017).
41 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy
Distinction and the Dual Functions of the Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1994)
for a compelling argument that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the terms “case” and
“controversy” were intended by the Framers to have distinct meanings and legal significance.
42 FALLON ET AL., supra note 11, at 74.
43 The Supreme Court has embraced the “dispute resolution” model of the judicial power in
a handful of key justiciability doctrines. Most notably, the Court “eschew[s] any role as a general
overseer of government conduct” through a rich body of case law imposing strict and unbending
standing requirements. Id. at 73; see, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61
(1992) (restating the three elements of modern standing law: (1) “injury in fact” that is “concrete
and particularized” and “not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’”; (2) a “causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of”; and (3) likelihood “that the injury will be ‘redressed
by a favorable decision’” (citations omitted)).
44 For a complete discussion, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and
Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984).
45 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity,
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991) for such an observation. Fallon
and Meltzer point to a set of modern doctrines in support of their finding that “adjudication . . .
functions more as a vehicle for the pronouncement of norms than for the resolution of particular
disputes.” Id. at 1800. Several commentators have welcomed and encouraged this development.
See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 290–91 (1990) (“Where a
constitutional issue is presented without sufficient concrete adversity, the Court should not decide
it. Sufficient concrete adversity, however, is a quality which varies from case to case, and should
not be a rigid barrier to jurisdiction.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); Henry P. Monaghan,
Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1371 (1973) (“Because the
Court has the ‘special function’ in our frame of government to declare authoritatively the
meaning of the Constitution, . . . the Court may properly render such pronouncements whether or
not recognizable private interests are involved.” (emphasis added)).

8

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[VOL. 93

46

petitions. Indeed, all three factors that the Supreme Court explicitly contemplates
in deciding whether to grant certiorari have clear roots in the “law declaration”
conception:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with
the decision of another United States court of appeals on [an] important matter;
has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision
by a state court of last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court,
as to call for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a
way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a
United States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important
question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or
has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant
47
decisions of this Court.

This set of considerations demonstrates that the Court is not in the business of
resolving disputes between individual litigants or correcting erroneous rulings by
lower courts, but is instead interested in declaring the law and ensuring its uniform
application throughout our federal system. As if to remove any lingering doubt,
Rule 10 declares pointedly that “certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error
consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated
48
rule of law.” In other words, no matter how badly wronged an individual litigant,
or how juicy an individual dispute, the Supreme Court will intervene only if the
law at issue requires clarification or unification.
This overarching perspective may play a key role in explaining the Roberts
Court’s peculiar reluctance to explicitly part ways with Supreme Court precedents
that are bereft of continued doctrinal significance. Indeed, if the Court’s primary
objectives are to declare the law and ease the uncertainty that accompanies state
and circuit splits, then it is hardly beneficial to eliminate Supreme Court
precedents that can be limited to their facts. A case that is limited to its facts
continues to control in future cases that raise similar factual scenarios, and can be
49
useful in a fact-intensive area like the one governed by Borak. In many areas,
then, the benefit of distinguishing a prior law declaration outweighs the cost of
extinguishing a precedent that has fallen out of the direction in which the Court is
moving the law.

46 SUP. CT. R. 10 (“Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion.”).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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B. Stare Decisis and Shaky Precedents in the Roberts Court
Suggesting that stare decisis influences the Roberts Court’s treatment of
50
weak precedents is akin to declaring that water is wet. But the extent to which
this doctrine contributes to the Roberts Court’s particular aversion to overruling
51
cases, and how (if at all) the Roberts Court approaches questions of stare decisis
differently than its predecessor Courts, are issues worth examining. This Section
considers these questions in two parts. Subsection II.B.1 provides a brief overview
of the doctrine of stare decisis. And subsection II.B.2 concludes that, indeed, the
Roberts Court seems to accord distinctive weight to considerations of stare decisis
and this is a primary contributor to the relatively slow rate at which it has
52
overruled Supreme Court precedents.
1. Stare Decisis Generally
53

Although stare decisis is not “an inexorable command,” the Court’s
“practice of citing and relying upon its precedents as modalities of argumentation
54
and sources of decision” is a fixture of the American legal system. Practically,
the doctrine takes different shapes in different courts. In the Supreme Court,
55
deference to precedent is “the preferred course.” Courts of appeals are not only
56
required to observe and apply Supreme Court precedents, but are also bound by
57
their own prior rulings. Federal district court decisions “may be disregarded in
58
future cases except for the purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel.”
A precedent’s stare decisis effect depends not only on the court in which it
59
60
was decided, but also on its legal subject matter.
As Professor Amy Coney

50 Cf. L. FRANK BAUM, THE MARVELOUS LAND OF OZ: BEING AN ACCOUNT OF THE
FURTHER ADVENTURES OF THE SCARECROW AND THE TIN WOODMAN 110 (1904) (“How very
wet this water is!”). This is a given because “the Supreme Court of the United States has long
embraced the doctrine of stare decisis as an appropriate consideration any time the Court
considers overruling past precedent.” Kurt T. Lash, The Cost of Judicial Error: Stare Decisis and
the Role of Normative Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189, 2189 (2014).
51 See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
52 See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
53 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
54 Michael J. Gerhardt, The Irrepressibility of Precedent, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1279, 1283
(2008).
55 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
56 See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)
(“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative to overrule its own decisions.” (emphasis
added)).
57 Barrett, supra note 32, at 1713.
58 Thomas R. Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, The Anastasoff Case and the Judicial Power to
“Unpublish” Opinions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 168 (2001); see also Amy Coney Barrett,
Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1015 (2003) (“As a general rule, the
district courts do not observe horizontal stare decisis.”).
59 This is obviously most important for purposes of vertical stare decisis—that is, the extent
to which a decision of a court in one layer of our federal judicial system controls the decision of a
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Barrett explains, “[s]tatutory precedents receive ‘super-strong’ stare decisis effect,
common law cases receive medium-strength stare decisis effect, and constitutional
61
cases are the easiest to overrule.” The impetus for this uneven treatment lies in
the Court’s frank recognition of the relative ease with which Congress can overrule
erroneous statutory interpretations as compared to the enormous challenge of
amending erroneous constitutional interpretations under the stringent requirements
62
of Article V.
In applying stare decisis, courts are forced to navigate the persistent tension
63
between allowing the law to be “settled” and ensuring that the law is “right.”
More often than not, the Supreme Court has prioritized the first of these conflicting
goals in adherence to Justice Brandeis’s famous sentiment that “in most matters it
is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
64
right.”
This doctrinal commitment is maintained through a handful of “prudential
65
and pragmatic considerations” that function like the semantic and substantive
66
canons of construction applied by courts in statutory interpretation.
These
67
68
considerations include a precedent’s “soundness”
and “workability,”
a
precedent’s evolution over time and the extent to which it has become doctrinally
69
embedded, and practical factors such as the vote total a precedent garnered when
70
it was decided.

court in another layer of that system. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.”).
60 Barrett, supra note 32, at 1713.
61 Id.
62 Id. (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–07 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
63 See Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of
Precedent, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1843, 1843 (2013) (“Constitutional precedents give rise to a
jurisprudential tug-of-war. On one side is the value of adhering to precedent and allowing the law
to remain settled. On the other side is the value of departing from precedent and allowing the law
to improve.”).
64 Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
65 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
66 For a thorough summary of these considerations, see Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as
Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 416–49 (2010).
67 See id. at 416–21; see also, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 363 (2010)
(overruling a precedent because it “was not well reasoned”).
68 See Kozel, supra note 66, at 421–25; see also, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
828–30 (1991) (overruling a pair of precedents that “defied consistent application by the lower
courts”).
69 See Kozel, supra note 66, at 425–44. The Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence
offers a classic example of this phenomenon. Because overruling a case like NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), would unwind much of the U.S. Code, subsequent cases
like United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), can only refine the edges of Jones & Laughlin
and its contemporary decisions even if those decisions are tragically flawed. Most agree that the
functional imperative of maintaining so much of the modern federal government ties the Court’s
hands in this area, even Justice Thomas, although to a lesser extent. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 601
n.8 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Although I might be willing to return to the original
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Stare decisis is a doctrine of uncommon influence and is deeply ingrained in
our judicial system. Indeed, while overrulings are quite rare, careful defenses of
overrulings are not. Detailed stare decisis analyses like the ones performed by the
71
overruling majorities in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and
72
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida have become as common as the blistering
73
dissents which departures from precedent typically provoke. As such, even in the
rare cases in which it is not honored, stare decisis is a powerful consideration.
2. How Stare Decisis Explains the Roberts Court’s Exceptionally Keen
Reluctance to Depart From Precedent
74

Stare decisis is not a constitutional or statutory commandment, but is
75
instead a doctrine of prudence and restraint that is made and manipulated by
courts. In no way, however, does this fact diminish the doctrine’s grip on the
Supreme Court. Indeed, stare decisis is among a distinct few legal doctrines that
truly transcend methodological and ideological differences. Allegiance to stare
76
decisis spans the judicial spectrum; from Justice Scalia—who was criticized for
77
recognizing stare decisis as “a pragmatic exception” to the originalist theory he

understanding, I recognize that many believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a
fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years. Consideration of stare decisis and reliance
interests may convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clean.”).
70 See Kozel, supra note 66, at 444–49; see also, e.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 828–29
(overruling a pair of precedents that “were decided by the narrowest of margins” and “over
spirited dissents challenging [their] basic underpinnings”).
71 558 U.S. 310. Even though he had already signed on to Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion (which itself considered stare decisis implications carefully), Chief Justice Roberts felt
compelled to write “separately to address the important principles of judicial restraint and stare
decisis implicated in [the] case.” Id. at 373 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
72 517 U.S. 44 (1996). In overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989),
the Court committed a fifteen-page stare decisis analysis. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59–73.
73 See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 395 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court today
rejects a century of history when it treats the distinction between corporate and individual
campaign spending as an invidious novelty . . . . Relying largely on individual dissenting
opinions, the majority blazes through our precedents, overruling or disavowing a body of case
law including [six cases].”).
74 And therefore not “an inexorable command.” Payne, 501 U.S. at 828.
75 Cf. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
281, 289–90 (1990) (“The inevitability of change touches law as it does every aspect of life. But
stability and moderation are uniquely important to the law. In the long run, restraint in
decisionmaking and respect for decisions once made are the keys to preservation of an
independent judiciary and public respect for the judiciary’s role as a guardian of rights.”).
76 See Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism and Stare Decisis, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1921,
1922 (2017) (“[Justice Scalia’s] opponents argued that [his] willingness to make a pragmatic
exception revealed that originalism is unprincipled in theory and unworkable in practice. Some
of his allies contended that a principled originalist should not be afraid to depart from even wellsettled precedent.”).
77 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 140 (1997) (emphasis omitted).
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78

espoused —to his personal friend but methodological adversary Justice
79
Ginsburg.
A 2007 study found Justice Thomas most willing to alter precedents in the
80
535 cases that a full Court heard between 1994 and 2000. However, Thomas
voted to break with precedent in a mere 4.3% of those cases—a minor 2.8% uptick
from Justice Ginsburg’s rate, which was the lowest of the four active Justices
81
82
83
84
included in the study. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor,
85
86
Kagan, and Gorsuch are no less committed to stare decisis.
A major reason for this universal commitment may be the increasingly
87
political nature of the judicial confirmation process.
This reality prompts
senators on both sides of the aisle to “press[] [nominees] in their confirmation
88
hearings to affirm their commitment to the doctrine of stare decisis,” lest a
nominee who would be willing to overrule a major Supreme Court precedent slip
through the cracks. Paul Clement suspects that this phenomenon is the leading
contributor to the “fealty” the Roberts Court accords to Supreme Court

78 See Antonin Scalia, Essay, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989),
for a general defense of Justice Scalia’s brand of originalism by the late Justice himself.
79 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Justice Ginsburg’s Gradualism in Criminal Procedure,
70 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 867 (2009) (“Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s preference for narrow rulings
that adhere closely to precedent . . . is well-known.”).
80 Jason J. Czarnezki et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Confirmation Hearings of the
Justices of the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 127, 140 tbl.B (2007).
81 Id.
82 See Lash, supra note 50, at 2212 n.151.
83 See id.
84 See, e.g., Robert Barnes et al., In Senate Confirmation Hearings, Sotomayor Pledges
‘Fidelity to the Law’, WASH. POST (July 14, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/13/AR2009071301154.html.
85 See, e.g., Michael Hotchkiss, Kagan Discusses the Constitution, the Supreme Court and
Her
Time
at
Princeton,
NEWS
AT
PRINCETON
(Nov.
21,
2014),
https://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S41/65/85E33/index.xml?section=featured
(“I
myself am a big precedent person . . . .” (quoting Justice Kagan)).
86 See, e.g., Evan Halper, Gorsuch Signals Reluctance to Overturn Long-Standing Court
Precedents
Like
Roe
v.
Wade,
L.A.
TIMES
(Mar.
21,
2017),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-essential-washington-updates-gorsuch-sayshe-would-be-reluctant-to-1490106071-htmlstory.html (“Part of being a good judge is coming in
and taking precedent as it stands . . . .” (quoting Justice Gorsuch)).
87 Professor Bill Kelley observed this in the relatively mild political environment of 2009.
See Meryl J. Chertoff et al., Federalist Society Panel Discussion: Judicial Selection, Federal and
State, 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 453, 456 (2009) (“We’ve seen a remarkable transformation in just
one generation in how the political culture views the federal courts. In the time of President
Reagan, judicial nominations were relatively uncontroversial, with very few exceptions. Imagine
today about a Richard Posner or Frank Easterbrook being confirmed with little to no controversy,
or an Antonin Scalia or Robert Bork to the Court of Appeals. Even Ken Starr was confirmed
easily.”). Professor Kelley helped guide President George W. Bush and his nominees through
dozens of judicial appointments, and is therefore about as expert as one can be in the complex
dynamics of this process.
88 Lash, supra note 50, at 2212.
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89

precedent, and the relative infrequency with which the Roberts Court has
90
overruled precedents shows that he may be right.
C. Avoiding Constitutional Questions and Distinguishing Precedents in the
Roberts Court
1. Constitutional Avoidance Generally
The constitutional avoidance doctrine urges courts to “refuse to rule on a
91
constitutional issue if the case can be resolved on a nonconstitutional basis.”
92
Justice Brandeis’s concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority
provides the most prominent summary of the doctrine:
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of. . . . Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. . . .
When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this
Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible
93
by which the question may be avoided.

In the statutory interpretation context, commentators have observed an
important distinction between the avoidance canon recited by Justice Brandeis in
Ashwander and an earlier version of the canon which required courts to avoid
statutory constructions that would be actually unconstitutional (as opposed to
94
constitutionally questionable or doubtful).
As Professor John Nagle observes,
“[t]he most noticeable difference between the two rules is that the
unconstitutionality canon requires a court to decide the constitutional question
95
while the doubts canon allows a court to avoid any such decision.”
96
While the doctrine has drawn a fair amount of criticism, it is not without
97
defenders and persuasive justifications. Regardless, the modern Court is strongly
89 Clement, supra note 26, at 19:14.
90 See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
91 Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1004
(1994).
92 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
93 Id. at 347–48 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
94 For an influential observation of this distinction, see John Copeland Nagle, Delaware &
Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495 (1997). The tighter triggering mechanism of
actual unconstitutionality controlled until the “little remembered case” of United States ex rel.
Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 (1909) reformulated it. Nagle, supra,
at 1495.
95 Id. at 1496–97.
96 See, e.g., William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch
Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 834 (2001) (criticizing the canon for its “serious[] intru[sion]
upon the roles of both Congress and the Executive in the constitutional scheme”).
97 For three “prominent rationale[s]” for the canon, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 11, at
80.
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98

committed to the canon.
Indeed, since it declared the doctrine’s existence
99
“beyond debate” in 1988, the Supreme Court has invoked the canon with
100
tremendous regularity.
2. How the Roberts Court’s Affinity for Constitutional Avoidance Influences Its
Treatment of Precedents
A pronounced mood of constitutional avoidance pervades much of the
Roberts Court’s jurisprudence. Indeed, the Court has “deployed the Ashwander
rules to avoid . . . issu[ing] broad [constitutional] rulings” in a “host of recent
cases . . . on some of the most controversial legal issues currently facing the
nation—including foreign surveillance, gay marriage, voting rights, the scope of
101
Congress’s enumerated powers, affirmative action, and mandatory union dues.”
A recent article went so far as to call “‘interpret[ing]’ new words into a major
statute in order to avoid holding the statute unconstitutional” “Chief Justice
102
Roberts’s signature move.”
Although that characterization is overblown, the
Roberts Court displays a regular desire to avoid sticky constitutional questions and
103
the institutional ramifications entailed in answering them.
104
The first Obamacare case and the chemical-weapons-love-triangle case of
105
Bond v. United States represent just two drops in the Roberts Court’s bucket of
constitutional avoidance decisions.
NFIB v. Sebelius is perhaps the finest example of the Chief Justice’s affinity
for the doctrine. Under a glaring public spotlight and facing severe political
backlash, the Chief Justice famously saved President Barack Obama’s signature
healthcare legislation by upholding the law’s individual mandate as a valid
106
exercise of Congress’s power to tax.
The Chief Justice cast his curveball to the

98 See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“This cardinal principle . . . has for so long been applied by this Court
that it is beyond debate.” (citations omitted)).
99 Id.
100 In the 1990s alone, Professor Kelley identified around thirty cases in which at least one
justice invoked the doctrine. See Kelley, supra note 96, at 833 n.5.
101 Andrew Nolan, The Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance: A Legal Overview, CONG.
RES. SERV. (Sept. 2, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43706.pdf.
102 Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 1275, 1278–79 (2016) (emphasis added).
103 I personally applaud Chief Justice Roberts for his attentiveness to the Supreme Court’s
brand, for maintaining the institutional and moral authority of the nation’s high court is as noble
an objective as any. See Adam J. White, Judging Roberts, WEEKLY STANDARD (Nov. 23, 2015),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/judging-roberts/article/1063131 (quoting an unsigned draft
article by the Chief Justice which warned that “the greatest threat to judicial independence occurs
when the courts . . . engag[e] in policymaking committed to the elected branches or the states”
(alteration in original)).
104 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600–01 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.).
105 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
106 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2594–96.
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107

legal world in pure constitutional avoidance terms: “[I]t is only because we have
a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible, that [the individual
108
mandate] can be interpreted as a tax.”
Two years later, Carol Anne Bond invited the Court to squarely address
whether federal treaties can criminalize individual behavior when she poisoned the
109
mailbox of her husband’s mistress.
Justifiably provoked or not, Bond’s actions
certainly appeared to violate the Chemical Weapons Convention, which provides
that “it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to develop, produce, otherwise
acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or
110
use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon.”
Because there was little doubt
that Bond intentionally used her chemical weapon of choice (arsenic) against her
111
husband’s mistress, she appeared to be plainly guilty under the treaty.
Once again, however, the Court sidestepped the case’s ripe “constitutional
112
questions surrounding the Necessary and Proper Clause and the treaty power” by
ruling more narrowly that, “[b]ecause our constitutional structure leaves local
113
criminal activity primarily to the States,”
Congress must give a “clear
indication” of its intent to “dramatically intrude[] upon traditional state criminal
114
jurisdiction” before the Court will interpret its statutes to do so.
While there is
admittedly a lot going on here—including the Court’s application of the state
115
sovereignty canon of Gregory v. Ashcroft —the Court’s manifest desire to avoid
the toughest constitutional questions presented by the case is paradigmatic of its
routine adherence to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.
As others have observed, this tendency of the Roberts Court is an extension
of the Chief Justice’s judicial philosophy, which calls on judges to “be like
116
umpires calling ‘balls and strikes.’”
This ideal has shaped a Roberts Court that
undoubtedly feels a need to “maintain its institutional legitimacy by deferring to

107 Indeed, the parties and Justices alike focused sharply on the law’s dubious
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause during oral argument.
108 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01 (emphasis added).
109 See Nina Totenberg, A Toxic Love Triangle Heads to the Supreme Court, NPR (Nov. 5,
2013),
http://www.npr.org/2013/11/05/243029845/a-toxic-love-triangle-heads-to-the-supremecourt; see also Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
110 Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1)
(2012).
111 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2081.
112 Dean M. Nickles, Recent Case, Bond v. United States, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE
68, 69 (2015).
113 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2083.
114 Id. at 2088 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350
(1971)).
115 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
116 Jeffrey Rosen, Opinion, John Roberts, the Umpire in Chief, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/opinion/john-roberts-the-umpire-in-chief.html?_r=0
(quoting Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005)); see
also Brett M. Kavanaugh, Essay, The Judge as Umpire: Ten Principles, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 683
(2016).
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the political branches” in a polarized nation.
In my view, this instinct animates
much of the Roberts Court’s constitutional avoidance jurisprudence (particularly
the Chief Justice’s opinions involving the hot-button issue of Obamacare) and is
critical to understanding its reluctance to overrule Supreme Court precedents.
CONCLUSION
118

Even a “lion of the law” like Justice Scalia—whose unique approaches to
statutory and constitutional interpretation revolutionized the business of the
119
Supreme Court—was rather ordinary in his devotion to precedent.
Such
devotion transcends ideological and methodological boundaries, and pervades
modern confirmation hearings. There is good reason for this, as proper respect for
precedent is vital to our judiciary and the government it helps oversee. Firmly
rooted cases that retain ongoing legal significance are immensely valuable.
Indeed, it is often “more important that the . . . law be settled than that it be settled
120
right.”
However, countless other cases linger in the United States Reports as quasiprecedents. Narrowly confined to their most idiosyncratic facts, these cases may
retain significance in limited factual domains but are practically dead for most
purposes. The Roberts Court’s unique reluctance to explicitly overrule Supreme
Court precedents will grow the ranks of such cases, and is explained in large part
by the factors identified in this Essay.

117 Rosen, supra note 116.
118 The Honorable Neil Gorsuch, President Trump Announces Supreme Court of the United
States Nominee at 9:14 (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/featuredvideos/video/2017/01/31/president-trump-announces-supreme-court-united-states-nominee.
119 Barrett, supra note 76, at 1921 (“Justice Scalia famously described himself as a ‘fainthearted originalist’ who would abandon the historical meaning when following it was intolerable
[from a stare decisis standpoint].” (quoting Scalia, supra note 78, at 864)).
120 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

